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Abstract—Android unlock patterns are among the most com-
mon authentication mechanisms on mobile devices. They are fast
and easy to use but also lack security as user-chosen gestures
are easy to guess and easy to observe. To improve the traditional
pattern approach, we propose Stop2Unlock, a usable but more
secure modification of the traditional pattern lock. Stop2Unlock
allows users to define nodes where they stop for a limited amount
of time before swiping to the next node. We performed a lab
study (n=40) and a field study (n=14) to show that this small
change in user interaction can have a significant impact on
security with a minimal impact on usability. That is, user-selected
Stop2Unlock patterns are significantly harder to guess while being
comparable in terms of usability. Additional analysis showed that
users perceived the stop component as a rhythmic and memorable
cue which supported the selection of higher entropy patterns.
I. INTRODUCTION
While most commercially available smartphones come with
built-in fingerprint sensors or sophisticated face recognition
features, PINs and unlock patterns are still indispensable
fallback mechanisms whenever probabilistic biometric authen-
tication fails. From a usability perspective however, unlock
patterns have many benefits as the sheme is optimized for
touch-based devices and fits well in the mobile context (e.g.,
it is fast and supports eyes-free interaction). At the same time.
From a security perspective, low-entropy unlock patterns can
pose a major vulnerability to the potentially sensitive user data
stored on the device as they are prone to observational and
guessing attacks.
As no other mechanism has managed to fully replace
unlock patterns, we follow the recommendations by Bianchi
et al. [5] to develop iterative improvements of the well-
established authentication methods to improve the security
of today’s smartphone ecosystem, and to build on already
optimized usability features. Similar to De Luca’s XSide [8]
and Krombholz’ et al. Force-PINs [18] we propose an im-
provement for gesture-based unlock patterns as found in com-
mercially available Android phones. However, in contrast to
most previous work which mainly focused on the prevention
of smudge attacks (e.g., [19]) or observation attacks (e.g.,
[10], [24]), we aim at increasing the practical password space
of such pattern concepts. As primary probabilistic biometric
authentication is generally resistant towards shoulder surfing
and smudge attacks, it has become increasingly important to
harden knowledge-based fallback authentication against guess-
ing attacks [7]. Our mechanism, Stop2Unlock, does not require
additional hardware and thus works with currently available
off-the-shelf smartphones. We show that the concept, which
introduces a practically invisible stop component, supports the
selection of a diverse set of highly memorable unlock patterns.
Figure 1 shows an example of Stop2Unlock with one stop node
(marked in red).
Fig. 1. An exemplary unlock process for Stop2Unlock, enhancing the
traditional unlock pattern with a stop component (marked with a red circle).
To prove the feasibility of our concept, we performed
two user studies. The results of our lab study and our field
study suggest that Stop2Unlock can improve security with
only a minimal impact on usability. In particular, we found
that the minor modification of adding a time component to
the interaction supported users in memorizing Stop2Unlock
patterns and thus led to a diverse set of high entropy credentials
which were actually used over the course of several days.
The contributions of this paper are:
• We propose Stop2Unlock as an enhancement of tradi-
tional unlock patterns. Our approach enables users to
stop at 1 to n nodes in their unlock pattern.
• We implemented a prototype application and per-
formed an evaluation of Stop2Unlock in a lab study
with 40 participants and a field study with 14 partici-
pants.
• The collected data shows that Stop2Unlock nudges
users to use high entropy patterns that perform sim-
ilarly well in terms of usability metrics compared to
the less-secure traditional patterns.
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II. RELATED WORK
A. Unlocking Behavior and Attacks
According to Harbach et al. [13], participants spend on
average 2.9% of their smartphone interaction time authenti-
cating. This result suggests that any security improvement for
unlock patterns should keep the additional usability overhead
as low as possible. Observation-based attacks have been found
to be a major problem in the mobile context. However, Eiband
et al. [11] studied actual stories about shoulder surfing on
mobile devices from both users and observers and found that
such observation attacks mainly occur in an opportunistic, non-
malicious way without any serious consequences. In addition
to observation attacks (e.g., [26], [21]), prior research has
investigated several alternative threat models for mobile unlock
mechanisms. E.g., Aviv et al. [4] investigated smudge attacks
on smartphones with Android unlock patterns and were able
to detect 68% of the patterns in their simulated scenarios.
Abdelrahman et al. [1] investigated thermal attacks and showed
that heat traces left on the screen can be used to successfully
guess a secret if the attack was performed immediately after
a successful authentication session. Krombholz et al. [17]
presented a microbiological attack based on bacterial growth
but were unable to show that the attack can be conducted
successfully.
In addition to practical interaction-based attacks, several
studies have found that pattern selection is highly predictable
and thus easy to guess (e.g., [2], [22]).
B. Improvements
Currently there are different suggestions for improving
the security of the authentication process for mobile devices.
Most concepts change the way of interaction to protect user
input from observation attacks [5]. For example, De Luca et
al. [9] presented ColorPIN, an authentication mechanism that
uses indirect input to provide security-enhanced PIN entry.
ColorPIN is a combination of a standard PIN with a color, for
example 1 (black) - 2 (red) - 3 (white) 4 - (black). ColorPIN
was significantly stronger than standard PINs while enabling
good authentication speed. De Luca et al. [8] also presented
XSide, an authentication mechanism which uses the front and
the back of a smartphone to enter patterns. XSide lets the user
draw simple shapes or gestures, i.e. is a system that can be used
eyes-free and provides increased protection against smudge or
shoulder surfing attacks. They also performed a user study to
show the effects of switching sides during authentication on
usability and security. Song et al. [20] proposed a strength
meter to help users to find a stronger pattern and found that
about 10% of the patterns generated without the meter could
be compromised through 16 guessing attempts. Zezschwitz
et al. [24] presented SwiPIN, an approach that combines
traditional PINs with simple touch gestures. They showed
that SwiPINs were significantly more secure against shoulder
surfing attacks, while being perceived as easy-to-use as PINs.
Krombholz et al. [18] developed a new type of PIN with
the use of Apples’ 3D-Touch. These so-called Force-PINs let
users select higher entropy PINs with a pressure component.
However, Khan et al. [15] re-implemented Force PINs and
conducted a comparative study on countermeasures to shoulder
surfing attacks and found that most improvements offer limited
protection. Our work extends the state of the art by adding a
tactile component to unlock patterns. In this paper, we show
that user-selected Stop2Unlock patterns are more resistant to
guessing attacks but remain usable in the wild.
III. CONCEPT AND PROTOTYPE
Stop2Unlock (Figure 1) was designed to improve the
traditional unlock pattern provided by the standard Android
environment. Our method is designed to motivate users to
select higher-entropy patterns that are harder to predict while
keeping them usable and memorable. Our approach does not
require additional hardware. The user can stop at each node
on the grid for a short time or run through it quickly when
entering the unlock pattern. For better memorability and to
train muscle memory (cf. [16], [14]), the user receives a subtle
vibration feedback when the application recognizes a stopping
point. Besides that, the rules for user-selected patterns remain
the same, as described by Uellenbeck et al. [23] (i.e. at least
four connected nodes and already connected nodes cannot be
connected again). Stop2Unlock offers a larger pattern space
by design. For every existing pattern, the stop component
expands the space by 2k, whereby k is the length of the
pattern. Considering the smallest pattern with four visited
nodes, the number of possible combinations grows by 24=16.
We developed a prototype application on Android which sim-
ulates a login screen with Stop2Unlock to collect data for our
evaluation. The application lets users select a new pattern and
presents an unlock screen. The user has up to three attempts
to unlock the phone with the correct pattern. For comparison
with the traditional unlocking method, we also implemented a
simulation for standard Android pattern unlock. Additionally
to the lab study application we developed a slightly different
application for our field study which offers notifications to
remind study participants to enter their patterns.
A. Threat Model
We assume that the attacker has physical access to a phone
which is protected by a biometric authentication mechanism.
The attacker activates the fallback authentication mechanism
(i.e., unlock patterns) and tries to unlock the device by guessing
the used pattern. As most users select simple and easy-to-
predict secrets with low entropy [20], an attacker is likely
succeed within a small number of guesses. To improve security
in such a scenario, we propose Stop2Unlock. Due to the intro-
duced stop elements, Stop2Unlock offers a higher theoretical
pattern space by design. Additionally, we expect that the time
element will be actively used and thus the effective password
space will be increase compared to traditional patterns. Please
note that we deliberately excluded observation-based attacks
from our threat model. We argue that the rise of biomet-
ric authentication concepts as a primary unlock mechanisms
provides a usable solution which can effectively reduce the
risk of such attacks in the wild. However, we would assume
that the vulnerability of Stop2Unlock would be comparable to
traditional patterns.
B. Pilot Study
We conducted a small pilot study with five participants
to determine the optimal stop time. The goal was to find
a stop time that only minimally compromises usability. All
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participants used Android unlock patterns before and had to
enter three pre-defined patterns with different stopping times.
We selected three different patterns with distinct difficulties.
For each pattern and each stopping time we measured failed
attempts and the mean authentication time for correct and
failed attempts.
Our first tests revealed that the best stopping time is
between 200ms and 400ms. We therefore repeated the study
with stopping times of 450ms, 350ms and 250ms. Almost all
participants reported that they were most comfortable with a
stopping time of 350ms. Reasons for that were the increased
error rate at the edges of the pattern with slower stopping
times, and the overall increased authentication time with
slower stopping times. This was confirmed via our collected
data: out of all tested stopping times, 350ms had resulted in
the fewest failed attempts. As expected, the authentication time
increases in accordance with increasing the stopping time and
was for all three tested times around 2000ms.
IV. LAB STUDY
We conducted a lab study to compare Stop2Unlock and
traditional Android unlock patterns. Our comparative eval-
uation is based on the following metrics: (i) authentication
time, (ii) error rate, (iii) memorability, and (iv) entropy. These
metrics have been used in related work, e.g., [18], [24],
[8], [25]. We did not assign unlock patterns but, similar to
real-world scenarios allowed participants to choose their own
Stop2Unlock, which we then used for our security evaluation
including entropy calculations.
A. Design and Procedure
Every participant was exposed to two conditions in ran-
dom order to minimize learning effects. The conditions were
as follows: (C1) traditional unlock pattern with the same
rule set as in the standard Android environment, and (C2)
Stop2Unlock. Participants (with academic and non-academic
backgrounds) were recruited in front of the university cafeteria
and via mailing lists and social networks. All experiments were
conducted in Vienna, Austria. In total, our sample has 40
participants (Table I). The participants were mostly familiar
with PINs and unlock patterns. We refrained from studying
memorability in the lab study as the setting is not suitable to
provide ecologically valid results. Participants were informed
that the study was about authentication. We did not use the
words usability and security in combination with the authenti-
cation methods in order to keep the results unbiased as far as
possible. Participation was voluntarily and participants were
not compensated. Each session started with a short briefing
about the purpose of the study. Our application generated
a unique ID for every participant. We did not provide any
details on benefits and drawbacks of the two methods to
keep the results unbiased. Then, the participants had time to
familiarize themselves with the two authentication methods.
This short training session, was used to reduce the effects of
an unfair comparison: a well-known and well-trained condition
against a newly introduced system. The order of conditions was
randomized and for each of the conditions participants had to
define a new pattern/Stop2Unlock pattern; we instructed the
participants to select a pattern memorable yet secure pattern.
Finally we simulated three authentication sessions during
Demographic Number Percent
Gender
Male 21 52.5%
Female 18 45%
No Information 1 2.5%
Age
Min. 20
Max. 57
Median 27
Mean 29.73
Used Smartphone
Android 23 57.5%
iPhone 16 40%
Other 0 0%
None 1 2.5%
Used Authentication Method
4-digit PINs 25 62.5%
Password (character and digit) 3 7.5%
Unlock Pattern 9 22.5%
Fingerprint Sensor 19 47.5%
Face Unlock 0 0%
None 1 2.5%
TABLE I. PARTICIPANT DEMOGRAPHICS (LAB STUDY, N=40)
which the user had to correctly authenticate. The metrics
were (i) authentication speed and (ii) error rate as defined by
De Luca et al. [8]. Concerning error rate we distinguished
between basic and critical errors. A basic error is an overall
successful authentication session in which it took the user one
or two tries to enter the pattern correctly. A critical error on
the other hand is a completely failed authentication session,
i.e. three erroneous attempts. We measured the authentication
speed from the first to the last touch of an authentication
session. An authentication session was initiated by a participant
pressing a button. The session ended after the correct pattern
was successfully entered or after three failed attempts.
In addition to the data collected through the Android ap-
plication we asked the participants a series of questions about
the tested authentication system. Apart from demographic data
about the participant (age and gender) we did not collect any
personal information. In order to link the technical data to
the questionnaire, we assigned each participant an id. The
questionnaire can be found in the appendix A.
Ethical Considerations: Our institute located in central
Europe does not have a formal IRB process but a set of ethical
guidelines to follow. Our data collection and processing was
compliant with these guidelines and the GDPR. We limited
the collection of personal information to a minimum. All
participants signed consent forms and agreed to participate
voluntarily.
B. Results
Our sample includes 40 participants who under two condi-
tions had to complete three successful authentication sessions.
Hence our quantitative results are based on 40 * 2 * 3 = 240
authentication sessions.
1) Authentication Speed: We only considered successful
authentication sessions, i.e. all sessions with a maximum of
two failed authentication attempts. In order to reduce the
impact of measurement errors, we removed two outliers from
our sample with authentication times larger than 14 and 21 sec-
onds, since they occurred because participants were distracted
from the study task. All collected Stop2Unlock patterns were
unique in our sample (i.e. 40 different patterns); concerning
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traditional patterns, 1-2-3-5-7-8-9 was selected four times and
1-4-7-8-9 twice (i.e. we have 36 different patterns in total).
Both samples (C1/C2) are normally distributed and have a
homogeneity of the variances. Further, by study design the two
conditions are independent from one another. In Table II we
Authentication Speed Mean SD
StopUnlockPattern 2.79 1.80
Traditional Unlock Pattern 1.32 0.76
Errors Basic Critical
StopUnlockPattern 9 1
Traditional Unlock Pattern 5 0
TABLE II. MEAN AUTHENTICATION TIME IN SECONDS, BASIC AND
CRITICAL ERRORS (LAB STUDY).
show the mean authentication speed and error rates for both
conditions. An independent sample t-test suggests significant
effects regarding the difference in authentication time between
Stop2Unlock and the traditional unlock pattern (t(40) = 5.4117,
p ¡ 0.05)).
As our study compares a novel modification of unlock pat-
terns to well-established traditional patterns, our participants
were not sufficiently trained to provide an ecologically valid
comparison. Assuming training effects over time, we estimate a
lower bound for authentication speed. According to Harbach et
al. [12] the average duration of a successful unlocking session
for traditional Android patterns is 0.91 seconds. Our solution
adds 350ms for every stop node of a selected pattern. Hence,
our approach adds an average of 0.76 seconds solely due to the
additional stopping component. Therefore, the lowest possible
authentication time for Stop2Unlock is approx. 1.67 seconds.
2) Error Rate: As shown in Table II, out of all 240
authentication sessions only one session with Stop2Unlock
failed. Furthermore 9 (3.75%) failed attempts (basic errors)
occurred with Stop2Unlock and 5 (2.08%) with traditional
unlock patterns.
3) Perceived Usability and Security: To find out how the
participants perceived this new authentication method, we
asked them a series of questions. We asked our participants
if they would like to use Stop2Unlock on their smartphones.
As expected, Android users were more interested in using the
method in comparison to iOS users. More precisely, 70% of the
participants with Android devices stated that they would use
Stop2Unlock (9% don’t want to use it, and 22% said maybe).
In comparison, only 56.25% of participants with iPhones or
other smartphones stated that they would use Stop2Unlock,
18.75% don’t want to use it, and 25% maybe).
To determine how participants perceived Stop2Unlock com-
pared to other authentication methods, we asked them to
rank several methods, including Stop2Unlock, according to
authentication speed and security (Table III). Interestingly, our
participants perceived the fingerprint sensor as the securest
and fastest authentication method. However, some users stated
that the fingerprint sensor is only the fastest if the recognition
works on the first try; often the users need two or more tries
to unlock the phone, and in that cases the PIN was perceived
as faster. Regarding security, most of the users thought that
Stop2Unlock is more secure than traditional unlock patterns
and 4-digit PINs. When considering authentication speed,
participants perceived Stop2Unlock as slower than traditional
unlock patterns and the fingerprint sensor. Finally, most users
are undecided about the unlock speed regarding Stop2Unlock
and 4-digit PINs.
Participant Votes
Method First Second Third Fourth
Security
Fingerprint Sensor 26 6 4 4
StopUnlockPattern 7 21 12 0
4-digit PIN 7 11 13 9
Unlock Pattern 0 2 11 27
Auth. Speed
Fingerprint Sensor 30 5 2 3
Unlock Pattern 4 21 13 2
StopUnlockPattern 2 5 14 19
4-digit PIN 4 9 11 16
TABLE III. USER-BASED ORDERING OF AUTHENTICATION METHODS
ACCORDING TO SECURITY AND AUTHENTICATION SPEED.
All this votes are of course highly subjective; the questions
were intentionally asked in a very open way to give the
participants room to interpret the security and speed based
on their own observations and experiences. Nevertheless, we
think this question gives valuable insights into perceptions of
authentication methods.
4) Informal Participant Statements: Ten participants ex-
plicitely mentioned to like the haptic (vibration) feedback
when the system recognizes a stop at one node and perceived
the stop component as security feature. 20 participants thought
that this system is not easily observable by other persons.
“This new pattern includes a somehow rhythmic com-
ponent, this maybe helps some people to memorize their
patterns.” (ID-94)
We also received negative feedback and gathered sugges-
tions for improvement; “People who already have problems
using their smartphone (or are overwhelmed with the func-
tionality), would have problems with this unlocking method.”
(ID-103)
V. FIELD STUDY
In order to see how Stop2Unlock performs in a real-world
setting, we conducted a field study. We installed a prototype
app on the participants’ private Android phones smartphones
to measure authentication time and error rate over time. In
contrast to previous work which investigated password choice
in online studies [], we opted to assess selection strategies in a
longitudinal field study. We argue that this approach supports
the ecological validity of the findings as selected patterns had
to be actually used multiple times over a longer period of time.
In addition, we studied the memorability of Stop2Unlock.
A. Design and Procedure
We recruit 14 Android users from sample from our lab
study and installed a dedicated app on their smartphones and
explained the goals of our study, i.e., to measure the perfor-
mance of Stop2Unlock different situations over a longer period
of time. We asked the participants to enter their Stop2Unlock
pattern at least three to five times a day. We did not mention
that we were going to study memorability in the course of
the field study. To remind the participants to use Stop2Unlock
multiple times throughout the day, we issued notifications three
times a day (morning, midday, and afternoon) and encouraged
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them to enter their pattern as often as possible. After installing
the app, our participants chose a new pattern. We instructed
them to select a pattern that is secure, easy to remember and
has at least one stop node. The field study was conducted over a
period of two weeks. We expected our participants to complete
between 100 and 200 successful authentication sessions. In
case the participant forgot their patterns, or wanted to change
it for whatever reason, they were provided an option to do so.
We also gave them an option to e-mail us in case they had
any problems or comments. We opted to deploy a separate
app and refrained from modifying the standard lock screen as
we didn’t want to change the preferred security settings of
our participant’s phones as some participants were concerned
about this at the beginning of the study. These participants
would not have taken part if the application had overridden
their selected unlocking method. For the evaluation, we used
the same metrics as in our lab study(Section IV-A).
After the study period, we interviewed about their ex-
periences during the field study to learn about problems in
specific everyday situations, for example when using public
transportation. We also asked them how often and why they
decided to change their patterns. We gathered feedback about
the stopping time, i.e., if the stopping time is perceived as too
long after a training period of two weeks. All interview ques-
tions can be found in appendix B. Additionally we conducted a
memorability experiment where we asked participants approx.
two months after completion of the field study if they could
remember their selected pattern.
B. Results
Overall, the 14 participants (P1-P14) completed 3,223
authentication sessions. Every participant completed 230.21
authentication sessions on average, i.e. about 16 sessions per
day. In total, the participants produced 405 basic errors and
30 critical errors (Table IV). Furthermore, we included the
error rate for basic and critical errors, pattern length, the stops
from every selected pattern and the completed study days, i.e.
the days on which a participant entered the pattern at least
one time. Participants P5, P11 and P13 changed their pattern
during the field study.
As requested, most participants distributed their authen-
tication sessions as evenly as possible over the period of
two weeks. Figure 2 shows the distribution of successful
authentication sessions per day. Some participants exceeded
the requested study time as well as the requested number of
authentication sessions, whereas others skipped a few days. In
the following, we list the participants who did not enter the
pattern on more than one day in a row. Subject P3 and subject
P12 skipped six days at the end of the study time due to failed
notifications. Subject P5 skipped four days and subject P7 three
days. We removed 14 authentication sessions due to measure-
ment errors. In order to detect these measurement errors, we
calculated the authentication time without the predefined time
for every stop and removed outlying authentication sessions,
i.e. those longer than 10 seconds. The mean authentication
speed over all successful authentication sessions was 2.41
seconds (median=2.06, SD=1.56), which is an improvement
over the results from the lab study and suggests training
effects over time. The shortest authentication session was 0.696
seconds, the longest was 11.59 seconds.
Fig. 2. Successful authentication sessions over time.
To visualize the development of authentication time and
error rate, we grouped the results in 16 bins (one bin per
anticipated study day, the average study duration was 15.5
days) to simulate a trend and make the results comparable.
Three participants changed their patterns halfway through the
field study and increased the number of stops, which yields
an increased overall authentication time. Consequently, we
split the results according to participants who changed the
pattern (interrupted lines) and participants who did not change
the pattern (solid line). In the first sample (participants who
changed patterns) we considered every pattern change as a new
start of the study. Despite the user being already familiar with
the new unlocking system, a newly selected pattern requires
additional learning time. We are confident that this solution
utilizes both samples in a comparable and clean way without
loosing the data from participants who changed their patterns.
Figure 3 shows the development of the authentication time
Fig. 3. Authentication time development based on the successful authenti-
cation sessions across all participants.
across 16 bins. Our results suggest that the mean authentication
time decreases over time. Figure 4 shows the error rate across
the study duration. For participants who did not change their
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Subjects P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7 P8 P9 P10 P11 P12 P13 P14
Completed Unlock
Sessions
183 235 212 271 155 157 200 104 180 190 502 100 571 163
Basic Errors 47 25 23 25 43 25 30 15 15 5 48 14 38 52
Basic Error Rate (%) 25.7 10.6 10.8 9.2 27.7 15.9 15.0 14.4 8.3 2.6 9.6 14.0 6.7 31.9
Critical Errors 3 0 1 1 4 4 0 1 0 0 2 0 1 13
Critical Error Rate (%) 1.64 0.00 0.57 0.37 2.58 2.55 0.00 0.96 0.00 0.00 0.40 0.00 0.18 7.98
Pattern Length 14 8 8 9 6
8
5 9 8 7 10 6
12
6
12 7
10
11
Stops in Pattern 5 1 1 2 1
3
1 2 1 2 3 1
4
2
5 1
2
4
Completed Study Days 17 15 9 16 11 16 12 18 12 16 12 11 16 13
TABLE IV. DETAILED RESULTS FOR ALL FIELD STUDY PARTICIPANTS. N=14
Fig. 4. Error rate development based on the successful authentication sessions
across all participants.
patterns, the error rate varies between 20% and 5%. For
participants who changed their patterns the error rate varies
between 11% and 4%.
1) Debriefing Questionnaire: All field study participants
also completed the debriefing questionnaire consisting of six
questions. Most of these questions where open-ended to en-
courage them to express their opinion.
We again asked the participants if they would use
Stop2Unlock to secure their own smartphones after having used
the method on a daily basis in a real-world setting. Seven
users said they would use this unlocking method, four said
maybe , and three claimed that they would not like to use
it. Eight participants reported that they perceived a decrease
in authentication time; the remaining six did not perceive any
difference compared to the beginning of the study.
Three participants changed their pattern during the field
study, and we asked them why they decided to do so. Two
participants stated that they wanted to try out a pattern with
more than one stop node; another participant just wanted to
try something different. One participant tried to change the
pattern, but immediately changed it back without having it
entered correctly but did not provide reasons for this behavior.
We also asked about problems occurred during the authen-
tication process in the real world (for example when using
public transportation). A few users stated that they sometimes
had problems hitting the stopping point, i.e. they did not stop
exactly on the point and the stop was not recognized by
the system. Six people reported that they experienced these
problems more often while they were on public transport or
busy with something else.
“Sometimes I had difficulties when entering the pattern with
a wet display, gloves, or in jerky environments (fast walk, bus
ride,...) in comparison to the traditional version. I think I make
more mistakes in these situations.” (P4)
“Like with traditional patterns, I often visited the wrong
nodes, but I had no problems with the additional stopping
feature.” (P1)
We furthermore asked our participants if they thought that
the stopping time should be reduced, increased or remain as
is after the two-week trial. Most of the participants stated
they where more or less satisfied with the selected stopping
time. One participant requested a feature to select an individual
stopping time. More precisely, eight users thought the stopping
time is well selected, five said the stopping time could be
shorter, and one person wanted a longer stopping time.
C. Memorability
To assess the memorability of the user-chosen Stop2Unlock
patterns, we sent out emails approx. two months after com-
pletion of the field study and asked the participants whether
they still remembered their patterns. In order to prevent the
participants from writing their pattern down, we did not tell
them that we would contact them again in this regard.
13 out of 14 participants immediately replied to our request
and sent us their selected patterns; nine participants correctly
remembered their complete Stop2Unlock patterns. Four par-
ticipants only partially remembered it. One user was not able
to recall the last two nodes, but managed to draw the rest of
the pattern, including all stopping points. Another user drew
one pattern in a mirrored way and the other pattern correctly,
but marked the wrong stopping point. Finally, two participants
were not able to draw the pattern from memory, but were
able to locate the stopping nodes when shown the pattern. Our
results suggest that Stop2Unlock secrets are memorable, even
after two months not using them. Even complex patterns with
up to five stopping points were remembered even two months
after they stopped using them.
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VI. SECURITY EVALUATION
Based on the collected data from our lab and field study, we
evaluated the security of this new authentication method with
respect to our threat model (Section III-A) This includes the
evaluation in relation to the practical and theoretical entropy of
Stop2Unlock as well as the basic pattern space. In this section,
we additionally want to discuss the impact of pattern length
on mean authentication time and error rate.
A. Entropy
Password entropy measures the probability distribution
of passwords over the entire search space. These measures
are based on different mathematical models, for example the
guessing entropy measures the average number of guesses that
an optimal attack needs in order to find the correct password
[23].
Obviously, the password space of Stop2Unlock is larger
than for traditional patterns, by design. One can simply enu-
merate all possible combinations, resulting in 389.112 219 [23],
[4] possible patterns. For every existing pattern of length k the
stopping component expands these possibilities by 2k, whereby
k is the length of the pattern. Considering the shortest pattern
with four visited nodes, the possibilities grow by factor 24=16.
As explained by Cherapau et al. [7] zero-order entropy
measures the entire search space of all possible secrets of
a given length and the size of a given alphabet. Zero-order
entropy assumes that each character is randomly selected and
represents the effort an attacker needs to spend on guessing
it. Zero-order entropy is measured in bits and calculated as
L ∗ log2(N), whereby L is the length of the secret and N the
size of the character set. For Stop2Unlock we have a length
between 4 and 9 connected nodes and a character set of 18 (9
times 2, for stop/no stop). Therefore, the lower bound for zero-
order entropy is 16.68 bits, and the upper bound is 37.53 bits.
While traditional unlock patterns have a zero-order entropy
between 12.68 bits and 28.52 bits, 4-digit PINs have an entropy
of 13.28 bits [7].
In theory Stop2Unlock is an improvement over traditional
unlock patterns because of the extended pattern space and the
higher zero-order entropy. However, this statement assumes
that user-chosen patterns are equally distributed across the
pattern space, which barely holds in practice. Real-world
patterns are distributed over a much smaller search space and
are therefore easier to guess. To provide a rough estimate, we
calculated the partial guessing entropy gain of our stopping
component based on the collected patterns (n = 58) from our
field and lab study. None of our participants used the same
pattern for both the lab and the field study, which is why we
use these datasets together.
1) Partial Guessing Entropy: In contrast to the guessing
entropy, the partial guessing entropy [6] (or α-guesswork)
calculates the average number of guesses that an attacker needs
to break a certain fraction of passwords. We calculate the
partial guessing entropy according to by Uellenbeck et al. [23].
As our dataset is also too small to assess the practical entropy,
we focus on the engropy gain of the stop component isolated
from the respective nodes.
Let µα = min
{
j |∑ji=1 pi ≥ α} be the minimal number
of guesses to cover at least a α fraction of the patterns (i=1 is
the pattern with the highest probability). While λα =
∑µα
i=1 pi
represents the actual fraction covered, which is greater or equal
to α. The partial guessing entropy is defined as follows:
Gα(X) = (1− λα) · µα +
µα∑
i=1
i · pi (1)
In equation 1 the first term represents the values that were not
guessed in the given fraction, and the second term represents
those that were guessed [23]. We express entropy in bits to
make this estimate comparable with other measurements. This
can be achieved with equation 2.
G˜α(X) = log
(
2 ·Gα(X)
λα
− 1
)
+ log
1
2− λα (2)
Table V shows the probability of user-selected Stop2Unlock
patterns from the lab- and field study (n = 58). We omitted
patterns that were selected only once within our sample.
We included patterns from both studies, participants who
completed both the lab and field study were allowed to re-
use the pattern from the lab study for the field study.
Stop Pattern Number Probability
- - - S - - - 4 0.069
- - S S S - - 4 0.069
- - S - S - - 3 0.052
S - - - - 3 0.052
S - - - S 3 0.052
- - - - S - - 2 0.034
- - - - S - S 2 0.034
- - S - - 2 0.034
- - S S S 2 0.034
S - - - - - S 2 0.034
S - S - S - S 2 0.034
S S S S - - - - S 2 0.034
... ... ...
TABLE V. STOP PATTERNS AS CHOSEN BY THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE
LAB- AND FIELD STUDY. N = 58 USER-SELECTED PATTERNS, WHEREBY S
REPRESENTS THE STOPPING NODE. FOR REASONS OF BREVITY, ALL
PATTERNS WITH LESS THAN 2 OCCURRENCES WERE OMITTED.
Based on the probabilities in Table V, we calculated
the partial guessing entropy. The results of our calculations
for α = 0.50 are as follows: µα = 12, λα = 0.532,
Gα(X) = 2.973, G˜α(X) = 1.3423 bit. This means that the
stop component offers an additional partial guessing entropy
of 1.34 bit. According to Aviv et al. [3], the self-reported
real-world 3x3 patterns offer an entropy of 9.94 bits (with
α = 0.50). Together with our estimated entropy gain of 1.34
bits, we are close to the entropy of 4x4 patterns which is 11.61
bits, according to Aviv et al. [3].
B. Pattern Length
In this section, we discuss the impact of pattern length
on mean authentication time and error rate. Stop2Unlock
adds overhead due to the stopping nodes. E.g.,3 stops add a
minimum stopping time of 1.05 seconds. Due to this timing
component, we evaluate at which point the selection of multi-
ple stopping nodes becomes infeasible.
Figure 5 shows the mean authentication time with respect
to pattern length. Our pattern length considers all selected
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nodes including stopping nodes, e.g.,1-2L-3L equals a length of
5. The mean time is based on all 58 selected patterns from both
studies and the first three successful authentication attempts
(n = 173). Harbach et al. [12] found that the average pattern
Fig. 5. Authentication time development based on the length of the selected
pattern (n = 173).
length for traditional unlock patterns is 5.9 nodes and the
average authentication time is 0.91 seconds. They also found
that every additional node increases the successful login time
by 147ms on average. We argue that a pattern length larger than
10 (including stopping points) is therefore infeasible. In this
case the mean authentication time reaches 4 seconds which
is way over the average authentication time for traditional
patterns. The average number of selected nodes in our sample
is 6.2, which is slightly more than for traditional patterns.
Figure 6 shows a similar representation of the error rate. With
respect to pattern length we not measure higher error rates. The
observed error rate varies between 0.0% and 5.0%, whereby
the patterns with a length of 4 to 7 nodes have an error rate
under 2.5%.
Fig. 6. Error rate development based on the length of the selected pattern
(n = 173).
In summary, pattern length has an impact on authentica-
tion time which should be reflected in length restriction of
Stop2Unlock.
VII. DISCUSSION AND LIMITATIONS
In the following, we discuss key observations and limita-
tions for Stop2Unlock based on our studies. During the lab- and
field study no participant forgot their pattern, which suggests
that Stop2Unlock secrets are memorable. This is a particularly
important feature as we expect that Stop2Unlock will mainly
serve as a fallback mechanism for biometric solutions. Another
interesting observation is that participants perceived the stop
nodes as “rhythmic components” which improved user expe-
rience and additionally tackled muscle memory and therefore
supported implicit learning.
Stop2Unlock allows users to select 1 to n stopping points
per pattern. Some participants selected very long patterns with
many stopping points resulting in exceedingly long authenti-
cation times and increased error rates. While this is a major
shortcoming of Stop2Unlock when it is used as primary au-
thentication mechanism, the use of long and complex patterns
is a desired user behavior for fallback mechanism (which
are used less frequently). Since Stop2Unlock might make the
login process more difficult in specific situations, for example
when the user is exposed to environmental constraints; e.g.,
authenticating while driving a the car or on a hands-free device,
we generally recommend this concept as a secondary fallback
mechanism.
As already pointed out, we did not measure the risk of
observation-based attacks like shoulder surfing or smudge at-
tacks as we expect that users will rely on observation-resistant
biometric approaches in their daily lives. While we assume
that Stop2Unlock are as vulnerable to observation attacks as
traditional unlock patterns, this needs to be shown in future
work. Another limitation is that our dataset of 58 patterns is
relatively small and therefore not sufficent to fully determine
the practical entropy of StopUnlock. Our results should thus
be treated as a rough indicator.
Finally, our sample of study participants is heavily biased
in terms of education and economic status. Thus, our results
might not be generalizable to other populations.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper we presented Stop2Unlock, a concept which
adds a practically hidden stopping component to traditional
Android unlock patterns. This timing concept enables the user
to select higher entropy patterns with minimal impact on
usability. We evaluated Stop2Unlock through a lab study and
a field study in terms of usability metrics such as authenti-
cation time, error rate and memorability, and security metrics
with respect to our threat model (i.e., guessing attacks). Fast
authentication times (2.97 seconds), a low error rate (3.75%
for basic errors) combined with good memorability suggest
that our design is a feasible concept for everyday fallback
authentication which nudges participants to select more diverse
and harder to guess patterns.
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APPENDIX
A. Questionnaire
1) What was your ID during the lab experiments?
2) Gender (male/female/no information)
3) Age
4) What kind of smartphone are you currently using?
(single- choice: iPhone, Android, Other, I don’t use
a smartphone)
5) What methods are you currently using to unlock your
smartphone? (multiple-choice: 4-digit PINs, pass-
word with character and digit, traditional unlock
pattern, fingerprint sensor, face unlock, none)
6) Order the following methods according to their se-
curity. (4-digit PINs, fingerprint sensor, StopUnlock
Pattern, traditional unlock pattern)
7) Order the following methods according to their au-
thentication speed. (4-digit PINs, fingerprint sensor,
StopUnlock Pattern, traditional unlock pattern)
8) Would you use the StopUnlock Pattern on your own
smartphone to unlock it? (yes/no/maybe)
9) What did you like about StopUnlock Pattern? (op-
tional, open-ended)
10) What did you NOT like about StopUnlock Pattern?
(optional, open-ended)
B. Questionnaire
1) Would you use the StopUnlock Pattern on your own
smartphone to unlock it? (yes/no/maybe)
2) Would you say you could enter the StopUnlock Pat-
tern faster and with fewer errors after a few days of
using our app? (yes/no/no difference)
3) Did you at one point change the StopUnlockPattern
and why? (open-ended)
4) What problems did occur when entering the StopUn-
lock Pattern in the real word, for example on public
transport? (open-ended)
5) What do you think of the stopping-time of the Stop-
Unlock Pattern, should it be faster or slower? (open-
ended)
6) Is there anything else you would like to let us know?
(optional, open-ended)
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